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MIKKO PISILÄ
Vicarious dissonance and the narrative
of the Gospel of Matthew
This article presents a novel social-scientific approach to the Gospel of Matthew, one of the most influential texts in the history of Christian-
ity. This approach combines social-psychological and 
narrative-critical methodology. The aim is to demon-
strate how the gospel narrative functions to transform 
the social identity of its audience and stimulate group 
commitment via the social-psychological phenomenon 
of vicarious cognitive dissonance. 
Introduction
At the very heart of the message of the Gospel of 
Matthew, there is a call for profound change: ‘Renew 
yourselves, for the kingdom of heaven has come 
near!’1 (Matt. 4:17). Entering the kingdom of heaven 
requires perfect righteousness (5:20), which seems 
humanly impossible (19:26). Despite this impossibil-
ity, the gospel speaks of ‘disciples of the kingdom of 
heaven’ (13:43) and calls all nations to join the com-
munity of disciples (28:19). This demanding call has 
also reached the nations. The Gospel of Matthew 
became a core scripture of Christianity, which spread 
rapidly through the Roman Empire, being currently 
the major religion globally. Certainly, the exceptional 
dispersion capacity of Christianity cannot be fully 
explained, but investigating the Gospel of Matthew 
may reveal at least a shadow of the mystery. 
In this article, the identity-transforming rhet oric 
of the Gospel of Matthew is analysed in light of the 
1 My translation for μετανοεῖτε, ἤγγικεν γὰρ ἡ 
βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν. The verb μετανοέω includes 
nuances of meaning: ‘perceive afterwards or too late’, 
‘change one’s mind or purpose’, and ‘repent’ (Liddell 
and Scott 1996: 1115).
social-psychological theory of cognitive disson ance, 
and its rather novel extension, vicarious disson-
ance. Applying the main theory is nothing new in 
gospel studies, but the application of the extension 
is. From its beginning, the developers of cognitive 
dissonance theory have been interested in religious 
conversion (Festinger et al. 1956). Subsequently the 
theory began to be applied to gospel studies (Gager 
1975). Over time, the theory of cognitive dissonance 
has gone through significant development (Harmon-
Jones and Mills 1999; Cooper 2007). The notion of 
vicarious dissonance however is rather novel in cog-
nitive dissonance studies (Norton et al. 2003), and 
the understanding of vicarious dissonance has been 
updated recently (Blackman et al. 2016). Therefore, 
the earlier applications of cognitive dissonance stud-
ies to the Gospel of Matthew have not asked similar 
questions to the ones raised in this study.2
In its overall methodology, this article com-
bines the theory of vicarious dissonance with the 
approach of narrative criticism, which is applied 
widely in biblical studies and specifically in the study 
of the Gospel of Matthew (Carter 2015). Applying 
the theory of vicarious dissonance to the narrative 
mater ial of Matthew, I will utilise narrative-critical 
views of the narrative-communication situation to 
reveal the arousal of vicarious dissonance as a process 
of communication. I will also focus on the characters 
2 Nicholas H. Taylor (1998) offers a review on the 
previous applications of cognitive dissonance studies 
in the field of early Christianity, including the gospels, 
and their criticism. David E. Aune (2013) shows a 
more recent review and application of cognitive dis-
sonance theory in figuring out the historical origin of 
the Christian faith.
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of the narrative as elements reflecting prototypical-
ity; ‘typic al or expected properties of a social group’ 
(Smith and Zárate 1992: 4).3 Prototypicality has 
been used as a key term for the experience of shared 
identity which is required for vicarious dissonance 
arousal. 
The aim of this article is to provide an examina-
tion of the dissonance-arousing narrative elements of 
the Gospel of Matthew. The first part of the article 
consists of methodological considerations concern-
ing cognitive dissonance and narrative criticism. The 
second part consists of an analysis of the dissonance-
arousing traits of the characters of the Gospel of 
Matthew. The results and implications of the analysis 
are summed up in the conclusions. 
3 Concerning the characterization of the Gospel of 
Matthew, John Aranda Cabrido (2010) has focused 
on the character of Jesus in his study. Jeannine K. 
Brown (2002) has studied the narrative portrayal and 
function of the Matthean disciples. 
Cognitive dissonance and narrative criticism
The following methodological considerations begin 
with the basics of cognitive dissonance theory. In 
the description of the origin and development of the 
theory I have chosen to focus on the views of Joel 
Cooper, who has been one of the main theorists of 
cognitive dissonance for decades. This includes also 
the development of the vicarious dissonance theory, 
which is connected with the theory of social identity. 
As the theoretical basics of vicarious dissonance are 
described, I will complement them with elements 
provided by narrative criticism. These are the con-
cept of the narrative-communication situation and 
the notion of character. With the help of these, I will 
introduce the concept of dissonance-arousing narra-
tive to provide a background for the subsequent 
analysis. 
Cognitive dissonance and vicarious dissonance
Presented originally in 1957 by Leon Festinger, the 
theory of cognitive dissonance concerns the tensions 
between the cognitions of human beings. Since then, 
the theory has given much inspiration to social psy-
chology. The main principles of Festinger’s theory are 
as follows (Cooper 2007: 6–9):
• Cognition refers to any psychological representa-
tion. It can be knowledge of a behaviour, one’s 
attitude, or the state of the world. 
• If a person holds cognitions A and B such that A 
follows from the opposite of B, then A and B are 
dissonant.
• The holding of two or more inconsistent cog-
nitions arouses the state of cognitive dissonance, 
which is experienced as uncomfortable tension. 
This tension has drive-like properties and must be 
reduced. 
• The magnitude of the dissonance is related to the 
importance of the dissonant cognitions.
• Dissonance can be reduced by revision of some of 
the dissonant cognitions, typically attitudes, which 
are more flexible than one’s behaviour or the state 
of the world.
As an example, if one considers giving money 
to the poor to be important, but happens to ignore 
a beggar, one may reduce the discomfort caused by 
these dissonant cognitions by 1. making a decision 
to be more generous in the next encounter with a 
beggar; 2. questioning the beggar’s authenticity; 
Pauhalla (‘On the Shoal’, 1987), a sculpture by Kari Juva in 
front of Pyhäjoki Municipal House. Photo: Anna Karjula.
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3. making a decision to donate to an organisation 
helping the poor instead; or 4. change one’s opinion 
on giving money to the poor (Cooper 2007: 6–8). 
Since 1957, cognitive dissonance theory has been 
developed from Festinger’s quite hypothetical con-
siderations into more accurate, empirically-tested 
models. The state of cognitive dissonance has been 
recognized as a physiological arousal, and the condi-
tions of dissonance arousal have been defined more 
accurately. According to the New Look Model of dis-
sonance presented 1984 by Joel Cooper and Russell 
Fazio: 
[I]nconsistent behaviour produces dissonance
• but only when decision of freedom is high
• but only when people are committed to their 
behaviour
• but only when the behaviour leads to aversive 
consequences
• but only when those consequences were fore-
seeable. (Cooper 2007: 73).
The second condition is connected to the third: 
the potential aversive consequences have to be con-
nected to the social reality outside the laboratory, 
instead of being theoretical (Cooper 2007: 63). When 
cognitive dissonance causes physiological arousal, 
the New Look model shows different ways to relieve 
the tense state of mind, such as labelling the arousal 
positively, or attributing it to an external source (ibid. 
77–79). In the absence of an obvious external source 
of discomfort, one attributes the uncomfortable 
tension to one’s own sphere of responsibility and is 
motivated to change one’s attitudes in order to render 
the consequences of the inconsistent behaviour non-
aversive (ibid. 79). 
According to the New Look Model, aversive 
consequences of a behaviour are essential for dis-
sonance arousal, and the motivation to avoid them 
is the key aspect of dissonance reduction. However, 
the definition of an aversive consequence depends 
on the standards of measurement. Aversive conse-
quences are perceived differently depending on the 
situation, one’s self-awareness, self-esteem, values, 
and the surrounding culture (Cooper 2007: 115–16). 
The standards of judgment can be based on what a 
person thinks of him or herself, or on the normative 
standards of society (ibid. 143). However, the norma-
tive standards of society seem to play the decisive role 
more often (ibid. 115–16). This happens especially 
in cultures prioritizing interdependence over inde-
pendence (ibid. 140–7). Cooper writes: 
The fact that dissonance is affected differently 
in different cultures further demonstrates that 
purely logical inconsistency between cognitive 
elements is not sufficient to arouse dissonance. 
Rather, it is the collision of freely chosen behav-
ior with normative and personal standards that 
give rise to the unpleasant state of dissonance. 
Behavior that violates normative standards in 
one culture may be perfectly consistent with 
normative standards in another. Whether 
behavior and attitudes are logically consistent or 
not, dissonance will be aroused only when the 
behavior violates standards and those, in turn, 
exist not in a vacuum but in a social context. 
(Cooper 2007: 149)
Cognitive dissonance is aroused not only by 
one’s personal behaviour, but also by witnessing the 
behaviour of those with a common social identity. 
The theory of social identity, originally presented by 
Henri Tajfel, sees identity formation as an interaction 
between personal and group identity (Tajfel 1981: 
255). Social identity is based on social categorization, 
which focuses attention on contextually relevant and 
meaningful similarities among people, and the dif-
ferences between them (Hogg 2008: 59). One’s social 
identity is formed through identifying with different 
groups, to different degrees, and not identifying with 
others. According to Cooper, shared identity leads to 
vicarious dissonance, if two other conditions are also 
met (Cooper 2007: 121): 
When I observe someone acting to produce 
an aversive outcome, I may very well feel his 
discomfort. This will happen to me if 
1. he and I share a social identity caused by our 
belonging to the same social group;
2. if the group is salient to me at the moment; 
and
3. if I am attracted to the group.
In addition to belonging to the same social group, 
the group has to be salient in the situation leading to 
dissonance arousal. Everyone belongs to several social 
categories or groups, being not constantly aware of 
6 Approaching Religion • Vol. 8, No. 2 • December 2018 
them. The arousal of vicarious dissonance requires 
awareness of the shared social group, and also attrac-
tion towards the group. If one is not attracted to the 
group one belongs to, vicarious dissonance cannot be 
observed (Cooper and Hogg 2014: 334). 
In contrast to the citation above, vicarious disson-
ance has more recently been shown not to be about 
one empathizing with the other and feeling his dis-
comfort, but about one being uncomfortable imagin-
ing oneself to be in the same situation as the other. 
Vicarious dissonance is not aroused by choices that 
are hard for the actor, but choices that are hard for 
the observer: ‘People process two crucial variables for 
dissonance arousal – choice and consequences – ego-
centrically’ (Blackman et al. 2016: 6). Even though 
vicarious dissonance is an egocentric phenomenon, 
it is aroused by the actions of others. This multi-
plies the occasions in which cognitive dissonance is 
experienced and needs to be reduced (Cooper 2007: 
117). Joel Cooper and Michael A. Hogg (2007: 382) 
have presented the process of vicarious dissonance 
between the participant P and the person observed, 
O, as seen in Fig. 1 (above).
The process of vicarious dissonance is very simi-
lar to the dissonance caused by personal actions. Also 
on these occasions, the discomfort can be reduced by 
a change of attitude (Cooper and Hogg 2007: 377–8).
Narrative criticism and dissonance-arousing narratives
The occasions arousing vicarious dissonance do not 
have to be experienced in real time; observing alleg-
edly in-group individuals through texts or recorded 
audio or video is sufficient for dissonance arousal 
(Norton et al. 2003; Blackman et al. 2016). I call 
these texts and recordings of individuals making free 
choices and acting against their previously expressed 
attitudes dissonance-arousing narratives. The meth-
odological aim of this article is to observe disso-
nance-arousing narratives outside the laboratory. 
Observations like this cannot be done with the accu-
racy of experimental studies with data surveys and 
control groups, but may still provide a viable analysis 
(Cooper 2007: 157). 
Outside of an experimental setting, the audience 
of a dissonance-arousing narrative becomes unre-
stricted. In this article, the audience is approached 
with theoretical tools provided by narrative criticism. 
This approach has been developed within the field of 
biblical studies, and is akin to the new rhetorical crit-
icism and reader-response movement, as its secular 
relatives (Powell 1990: 19). According to Mark Allan 
Powell, ‘the goal of narrative criticism is to read the 
text as the implied reader’ (ibid. 18, emphasis mine), 
which, as the implied reader is an idealized abstrac-
tion ‘may be somewhat unattainable, but it remains 
Reprinted from Joel Cooper and Michael A. Hogg’s ‘Feeling the anguish of others: a theory of vicarious dissonance’, p. 382, 
published in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology vol. 39 in 2007, with permission from Elsevier.
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a worthy goal nevertheless’ (ibid. 21). H. J. Bernard 
Combrink provides two complementary perspectives 
on the concept of the implied reader:
Brown (2002: 128) defines the implied reader as 
a textual construct, constructed from the narra-
tive text, responding appropriately to the text’s 
rhetorical devices and fulfilling the goals of the 
text. S/he is not limited to a first-time reader 
and, is also equivalent to what some would call 
‘the ideal reader’. Besides knowing what has 
been told in the course of the narrative, the 
implied reader also has knowledge external to 
the narrative, including historical and cultural 
information. (Combrink 2006: 26–7, italics 
mine)
Warren Carter (2001: 4), who prefers the term 
‘authorial audience’, attempts to define the 
implied reader slightly more specifically and 
understands ‘the ‘authorial audience’ to be the 
receiver, or audience, the author has ‘in mind’ 
in writing the text. It is the author’s image of the 
audience being addressed by the text, the image 
of the audience to whom the gospel writer 
writes. This image approximates, though it is 
not the same as, the actual audience’. This means 
that the authorial audience is a ‘contextualized 
implied reader’ with the linguistic competence 
and sociocultural knowledge to read the text 
appropriately and in a way assumed by the text 
but not made explicit in it. 
Narrative is transmitted in a situation of commu-
nication. Seymour Chatman (1979: 151) depicts the 
whole narrative-communication situation as seen in 
Fig. 2 (below).
Applying this image to the vicarious disso-
nance studies mentioned above (Norton et al. 2003; 
Blackman et al. 2016), the real author is a researcher 
who has taken part in the writing of the study, and real 
reader is anyone who has read the study. The authors 
have not put their whole personality into their writ-
ing process and just let the stream of consciousness 
flow: they have only written scientifically valid and 
relevant facts and thoughts. The implied author is the 
scientific voice leading the reader through the text, 
and the real reader is unable to link this narrative 
voice to an individual real author behind a collabor-
atively written text. The same applies in the oppo-
site direction: the real authors have not been able to 
imagine all the potential persons reading the study, 
but they have been guided by a concept of a scien-
tifically oriented implied reader in their writing pro-
cess. Inside the narrative, there may or may not be a 
narrator and a narratee. In the case of these studies, 
the contributors have written descriptions of their 
conversations with the participants. In these descrip-
tions the researcher is a narrator and the participant 
is a narratee. Since one can tell a story about a person 
telling a story, there may be several levels of narra-
tors and narratees. In a vicarious dissonance study, 
there is a description of the participants listening to a 
tape containing a conversation between a researcher 
and a fictive participant (Norton et al. 2003: 49). In 
this case, the narrator (researcher) presents the nar-
ratee (participant) a conversation between a second-
degree narrator (recorded researcher) and second-
degree narratee (fictive participant). 
Applying Fig. 2 to the Gospel of Matthew, the 
real author is unknown. According to most scholars, 
the Gospel of Matthew was composed in Syria, most 
probably in Antioch, in the final quarter of the first 
century ad (Davies and Allison 2004: 1–147). The real 
reader is anyone who has read the Gospel of Matthew. 
The implied author is the overall narrative voice in the 
text of the Gospel of Matthew. The implied reader is 
the author’s construction, which approximates to the 
real reader, and can be analysed from the narrative 
text. Since books, not to mention literacy, were rare 
in antiquity, copies of the Gospel of Matthew were 
usually communally owned and read aloud. Thus, the 
term authorial audience would be a more appropri-
ate term than implied reader. In the text of the Gospel 
of Matthew, the narrator is usually Jesus. He speaks 
to various combinations of narratees; for example the 
high priests and elders in Matt. 
21:23–22:14. In this section, there 
are also second-degree narra-
tors and narratees. In 21:38, the 
author tells of Jesus describing 
tenant farmers narrating to each 
other a vision of dispossessing Reprinted by permission of the publisher, Cornell University Press.
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their landlord of his property by killing his inheritor. 
In the dissonance-arousing narratives, identifying 
with the characters in the narrative is a crucial process 
for the arousal of vicarious dissonance. Powell defines 
the characters as narrative elements as follows:
Characters are the actors in a story, the ones 
who carry out the various activities that com-
prise the plot … We should not limit our 
con cep tion of characters to individuals, since 
it is possible for a group to function as a single 
character. In our Gospels, this is true not only 
of the crowds that follow Jesus but also of his 
disciples and the religious leaders. When the 
narrative reports that the disciples do something 
or say something, the reader does not imagine 
that these 12 individuals actually move or speak 
in unison. Such stereotyping is a conventional 
literary device by which a number of characters 
are made to serve a single role. (Powell 1990: 51)
 
In the Gospel of Matthew, the implied audience is 
designed to identify with certain characters and not 
to identify with others. This is most clearly indicated 
by the relationship between Jesus and those charac-
ters. Jesus is the first, last, and central character in the 
narrative, the protagonist, and other characters are 
categorized by their relationship with him. 
In terms of social psychology, Jesus is an exemplar 
representing the essential prototypical traits of his 
social category. In terms of the Gospel of Matthew, 
this category could be called children of God (Matt. 
5:9, 45). Eliot R. Smith and Michael A. Zárate de -
scribe the terms exemplar and prototype as follows: 
An exemplar differs from a prototype or 
schema, both of which are generally taken to 
involve abstract knowledge about the typic al 
or expected properties of a social group. Ex -
emplars (cognitive representations of individu-
als) can range from very detailed, complete 
representations of specific people (my mother 
or my close friend) to minimal representations 
involving only two or three attributes. A person 
need not to be encountered face to face to be 
represented in memory but may be imagined 
or experienced through the media or a second-
hand account … (Smith and Zárate 1992: 4)
Joel Cooper and Michael A. Hogg have summar-
ized the significance of the notion of prototype for 
the vicarious dissonance studies as follows:
In summary, when people identify with a social 
group, processes unfold that make it likely they 
will experience what other prototypical group 
members experience. Because of people’s  
ten dency to engage in social categorization 
and to fuse their individual selves to the group 
prototype, we suggest that people who witness a 
fellow group member engaging in dissonance-
producing behaviors will experience disson-
ance vicariously. And the greater the level of 
identification an individual has with a group, 
the greater the level of vicarious dissonance. 
(Cooper and Hogg 2014: 331)
The notions of prototype and exemplar express 
the abstract and case-specific sides of social cate-
gorization (Hogg 2008: 60).4 The characters of the 
Gospel of Matthew function as narrative exemplars. 
This article also utilizes the notion of the prototype, 
which has been used in vicarious dissonance studies 
(Cooper and Hogg 2007: 378–81). It has been noted 
that people experience dissonance vicariously with 
group members of the same degree of prototypical-
ity: those in the core of the group identify with each 
other, and those on the periphery identify with each 
other (Cooper and Hogg 2007: 379–81). An examin-
ation of the exemplary characters of the Gospel of 
Matthew and their prototypical traits gives the basis 
for assessing the potential of vicarious dissonance 
aroused by the composition. 
Dissonance-arousing narrative characters
The following analysis is focused on the dissonance-
arousing properties of certain prototypical narrative 
characters of the Gospel of Matthew. According to 
the theory of vicarious dissonance, the dissonance-
arousing actions of the prototypical characters will 
cause dissonance in the audience of the narrative. 
The analysis is based on a definition of cognitive 
dissonance as ‘a state of arousal that occurs when a 
person acts responsibly to bring about an unwanted 
consequence. The measuring rod for deciding if a 
4 On the neurological basis of the distinction, see 
Luomanen (2007: 217–19).
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consequence is undesired can be the internalized 
standards of one’s society, culture, or family, or it 
can be very personal standards that have been gen-
erated by what one thinks of oneself ’ (Cooper 2007: 
182). The analysis is divided in four parts, accord-
ing to the characters in the focus. Each part begins 
with an examination of the prototypical features of 
the character in a dissonance-arousing narrative 
from Matthew. After that, the dissonance-arousing 
actions of the character will be analysed from the 
perspectives of responsibility and consequences of 
the action. In the biblical quotations, NRSV stands 
for New Revised Standard Version. In some cases, I 
have made my own translations. 
Joseph in the Birth Narrative 
Joseph, the father of Jesus, is the central actor in 
the first two chapters of the Gospel of Matthew. The 
narrative begins with the genealogy of Jesus, which 
establishes the prototypical Jewish origin of Joseph 
and Jesus (Matt. 1:1–17). Even though Jesus is con-
ceived by the Holy Spirit, Joseph becomes his legit-
imate father (1:18, 24–5). Both Jesus and Joseph are 
called a ‘Son of David’ (1:1, 20). In the Gospel of 
Matthew, this is the title of the Messiah recognized 
by the crowds (9:27, 12:23, 20:30–1, 21:9) and the 
religious leaders (21:15, 22:42), even by a non-Jew-
ish woman (15:22). Hence, Joseph shares the mes-
sianic title of Jesus. This title is given him by an angel 
of the Lord, which appears to him in a dream three 
times (1:20, 2:13, 20). The author also calls Joseph 
‘righteous’ (δίκαιος, 1:19). The genealogy, righteous-
ness, and visions of Joseph make him a prototypical 
man from the perspective of the Jewish religion, a 
true descendant of the patriarchs.5 The ideology of 
the Gospel of Matthew is a variant of second-temple 
Judaism (Runesson 2016: 442–3), which is embodied 
in the character of Joseph. He anchors Jesus to the 
origins and history of the people of God. 
In the birth narrative of Matthew 1–2, Joseph is 
mentally wrestling with the question of the unex-
pected pregnancy of his betrothed wife, which hap-
pened before their marital union (1:18). According 
to the Mosaic Law, this was a good reason for divorce 
(Deut. 24:1). A betrothed woman lying with another 
man might even have deserved the death penalty 
(Deut. 22:24), even though these punishments might 
not have been put into practice (John 8:3–11, 18:31). 
In Matthew 1:19, the righteous Joseph decides not 
to put his wife through the shame of public judge-
ment, but to divorce her privately. There are alterna-
tive explanations for the reference to the righteous-
ness of Joseph: either he chooses the private option 
despite his righteousness, or due to his righteousness. 
Hence, the word may refer to his love of the Mosaic 
Law, or to his love of Mary, or even both. The first 
option seems most consonant with the Matthean use 
of δίκαιος (Hagner 2000: 18). 
5 On the nightly visions of the patriarchs, see Gen. 
15:12–17, 26:24, 28:11–17, 31:10–13.
A Noel installation (2002) by Kaisa Kehus, Heli Kittilä, 
Aaro Leipälä, and Solveig Malinen in front of the Pyhäjoki 
Church. Photo: Aaro Leipälä.
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Joseph, being responsible for the future of his 
family, is preparing for the divorce. Under these 
circumstances an angel of the Lord appears to him 
(Matt. 1:20–1). The message of the Lord is twofold: 
First, he should not hesitate to marry Mary, since her 
pregnancy is caused by the Holy Spirit. Second, he 
should give his son the name ‘Jesus’6, since he is the 
saviour of his nation. Having woken up, Joseph acts 
according to the vision (1:24–5). This action contains 
two kinds of potential for dissonance arousal. The 
first one is not so obvious to the authorial audience: 
Joseph might have questioned the authenticity of his 
divine vision. In this case, a later revelation of Jesus as 
a sinner would be the possible aversive consequence. 
The second potential source of dissonance arousal is 
more obvious: other people might put the authenti-
city of his vision into question. In this case, the pos-
sible aversive consequence for Joseph would be loss of 
the social status of a righteous man. For the authorial 
audience of Matthew, the action of Joseph demon-
strates two rules to be applied in dissonance-arousing 
situations: not putting outer righteousness above the 
inner (6:1–18, 23:23–6), and not rejecting Jesus for 
the sake of conformity (10:16–39).
John and his audience in the baptism narrative
John the Baptist is the central actor in the third chap-
ter of the Gospel of Matthew as a preacher of con-
version and the baptizer of Jesus and multitudes of 
others. After that, his character is developed further 
in two narratives: In 11:1–19 there is an indirect con-
versation between Jesus and the captured John, who 
becomes the subject of Jesus’ speech to the crowds. In 
14:1–12, he is executed. These three sections are now 
examined together as a baptism narrative.
The character of John the Baptist reflects the 
proto type of the prophet. The proclamation of con-
version is at the core of the message of the proph-
ets of the Hebrew Bible.7 John joins the chorus and 
proclaims the necessity of conversion and the coming 
of the kingdom of heaven (Matt. 3:2). According to 
the author, his proclamation fulfils the prophecy of 
Isaiah (Matt. 3:3): ‘A voice cries out: In the wilder-
ness prepare the way of the Lord, make straight in 
6 Based on Hebrew עַָשׁי ‘deliver, save’ (Brown 2003: 
446). 
7 See Isa. 1:16–20; Jer. 3:12–4:4; Ezek. 18:21–32; Hos. 
14:2–10; Joel 2:12–13; Amos 5:4–6; Jonah 2:4–5; Mic. 
6:8–8; Hab. 2:4; Zeph. 2:1–3; Zech. 1:3; Mal. 3:7.
the desert a highway for our God’ (Isa. 40:3 NRSV). 
Along with the prophetic proclamation, John also 
lives like a prophet: ascetically in the wilderness, 
eating locusts and honey, and dressed in camel hair 
and a leather belt (Matt. 3:4, 11:8).8 In his asceticism, 
he lives according to the teaching of Jesus: not serv-
ing wealth, but God (6:19–24). John also dies accord-
ing to the teaching of Jesus: the prophets of the king-
dom of God have been, and will be, persecuted and 
killed (5:10–12, 23:34–5). The baptism performed by 
John is the starting point of the public career of Jesus 
(3:13). Immediately after the baptism, the divine 
nature of the episode is confirmed by a heavenly 
vision and voice (3:16–17). According to Jesus, John 
is ‘more than a prophet’, fulfilling the predictions of 
former prophets (11:7–15). 
According to Hogg, a category prototype may 
effectively represent the average group member, but 
sometimes prototypes may be extreme or polarized 
relative to the central tendency of a specific group. 
The way of perceiving or representing a social group 
is context-dependent, and so are the prototypes 
(Hogg 2008: 60). In the baptism narrative, John and 
Jesus represent prototypically extreme prophets. In 
that narrative, there are also average characters: In 
3:5–6, ‘Jerusalem, the whole of Judea and the whole 
of the surroundings of Jordan’ confess their sins and 
are baptized by John. Later, Jesus paradoxically com-
pares the prototypicality of John and those average 
persons: ‘Truly I tell you, among those born of women 
no one has arisen greater than John the Baptist; yet 
the least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he’ 
(11:11 NRSV). Among the hearers of John, there are 
also characters representing the opposites of proto-
type (i.e. stereotypes; see Jokiranta and Luomanen 
2013: 79). These Pharisees and Sadducees come to be 
baptized, but are not said to have confessed their sins 
(3:7). John calls them a ‘brood of vipers’ and threat-
ens them with the wrath to come (3:8–10).
One of the actions of John has true potential 
for dissonance arousal: In 14:4, he is said to have 
expressed his disapproval to the ruler Herod Antipas, 
who had immorally taken the wife of his brother, 
Philip. There are foreseeable aversive consequences 
8 His life in the wilderness resembles especially that of 
Eliah (1 Kings 17:2–7, 19:3–19), and the simplicity of 
his diet of Ezekiel (Ezek. 4:9–15). John was, however, 
much more properly clothed than Isaiah, who spent 
three years naked as a prophetic sign (Isa. 20:1–6).
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of this action chosen by John: he is captured and 
finally executed (14:3–11). During his imprison-
ment, John may have experienced cognitive disso-
nance, since he sends his disciples to ask Jesus (11:3 
NRSV): ‘Are you the one who is to come, or are we 
to wait for another?’ Jesus gives him a dissonance-
reducing answer (11:4–6 NRSV): ‘Go and tell John 
what you hear and see: the blind receive their sight, 
the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, 
the dead are raised, and the poor have good news 
brought to them. And blessed is anyone who takes no 
offence at me.’ John is assured that he has been serv-
ing the truth. The authorial audience of the Gospel 
of Matthew is at the same time being encouraged 
to serve the messianic truth in dissonance-arousing 
situations. 
The audience of John’s sermons perform a collec-
tive dissonance-arousing action by confessing their 
sins and receiving baptism (3:6). This involves ques-
tioning their former social status and making a com-
mitment to a new identity provided by the preaching 
and baptism delivered by John. The possible aversive 
consequence of this action is shame: What will the 
others think of me, when I confess my sins? And 
what if I have believed a false prophet? Despite the 
possible consequences, they confess their sins and 
make a commitment of faith. The authorial audience 
of Matthew is given examples of seeking the kingdom 
of God and making choices for the new identity.
The audience of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount
The Sermon on the Mount in Matt. 5–7 is the first 
and the lengthiest of the five discourse sections in the 
Gospel of Matthew.9 According to Donald Hagner, 
‘The evangelist’s placement of this first discourse 
toward the beginning of the Gospel indicates the 
attached importance of the material’ (Hagner 2000: 
82–3). This discourse of teaching is focused on the 
faith and life of an individual, on the person’s inner 
and outer righteousness. Before the discourse, Jesus 
has called upon four disciples to follow him (4:18–
22) and they have wandered around Galilee. There 
he preaches in synagogues and heals the sick, causing 
big crowds to follow him (4:23–5). Seeing the crowds, 
9 On the structure of Matthew and its division into 
sections of discourse and narrative material, see 
Davies and Allison (2004: 58–61). In this article, the 
discourse sections are seen as parts of the overall nar-
rative.
Jesus climbs a mountain and gives his teaching. In 
chapters 5–7, Jesus is the narrator and he has two 
narratees; the crowds and his disciples. Therefore, the 
audience of the Sermon of the Mount represents dif-
ferent prototypes.10 The difference between average 
and extreme prototypes is also somehow blurred, as 
Jesus prescribes extreme deeds (especially 5:28–30) 
for average persons. He also directs his words towards 
stereotypical characters, who remain outside the 
kingdom of heaven. In the parable of the two build-
ers, Jesus expresses this heterogeneity of his audience 
(7:24–7). 
Through the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus rhet-
orically connects his audience with the prototypes of 
the ‘blessed’11 (5:3–12), the ‘child of God (5:13–16)’, 
and the ‘sound builder’ (7:24–25). Jesus begins his 
teaching by praising the blessed, who are ‘poor in 
spirit’ (5:3), ‘grieving’ (5:4), ‘humble’ (5:5), ‘hungry 
and thirsty for justice’ (5:6), ‘merciful’ (5:7), ‘pure-
hearted’ (5:8), ‘peacemakers’ (5:9), and ‘persecuted 
for the sake of righteousness’ (5:10). At this point, 
he switches his praise from the third to the second-
person plural, and parallels his hearers with ancient 
prophets (Matt. 5:11–12 NRSV): ‘Blessed are you 
when people revile you and persecute you and utter all 
kinds of evil against you falsely on my account. Rejoice 
and be glad, for your reward is great in heaven, for in the 
same way they persecuted the prophets who were before 
you.’ After this, Jesus emphasizes the significance of 
his narratees by comparing them to the ‘salt of the 
earth’ (5:13), the ‘light of the world’ (5:14), a ‘city built 
on a hill’ (5:14) and a ‘lamp in the house’ (5:15). In 
5:16, he explains the aim of these prototypic al titles: 
the glory of the heavenly Father. Hence, he implicitly 
calls his narratees the ‘children of God’, a title he has 
already said applies to the peacemakers in 5:9. This 
title is implicitly used through the Sermon on the 
Mount by appealing to the relationship of the nar-
ratees with their heavenly Father (5:45, 48; 6:1, 4, 6, 
8–9, 14, 18, 26, 32; 7:11, 21). The authorial audience 
of the Sermon on the Mount is called to identify with 
the prototype of a child of God. 
In the fifth chapter, Jesus summarizes the ethi-
cal message of the Sermon on the Mount by means 
of two comparisons: First, righteousness in the 
10 Lauri Thurén (1990) has shown the implied audience 
of 1 Peter to similarly reflect mixed prototypes. 
11 Μακάριος, a Greek correspondent for Hebrew יֵרְשַׁא 
‘deeply happy, blessed’ (Hagner 2000: 91).
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kingdom of God exceeds that of the scribes and 
the Pharisees (5:20). Second, his hearers should be 
as perfect as their heavenly Father is (5:48). In the 
sixth chapter, Jesus exhorts his hearers to practise 
piety in secret (6:1–18), to forgive others (6:14–15), 
and to abstain from seeking material gain (6:19–34). 
In the seventh chapter, Jesus forbids hypocritical 
judgements (7:1–5), but also uncritical acceptance of 
every thing (7:6; Davies and Allison 2004: 674). After 
this, he exhorts his listeners to be active in asking for 
their needs from the heavenly Father (7:7–11). In 
addition to this, Jesus prompts action regarding the 
needs of others: to treat others in the way one desires 
to be treated oneself is the core of the Torah and pro-
phetic scriptures (7:12). These two exhortations to 
take action are summed up by third, in the form of 
an emotionally appealing parable: 
Enter through the narrow gate; for the gate is 
wide and the way is easy that leads to destruc-
tion, and there are many who take it. For the 
gate is narrow and the road is hard that leads 
to life, and there are few who find it. (Matt. 
7:13–14 NRSV)
After this parable, Jesus warns his followers about 
false prophets (7:15–23). Jesus finishes his speech 
with the parable of two builders. The parable func-
tions as a conclusion to the whole Sermon on the 
Mount in chapters 5–7, but also echoes the exhort-
ations in chapter 7, especially verses 13–14. The par-
able exhorts its hearers to take action: One who hears 
the words of Jesus and acts accordingly is like a wise 
builder, who builds his house on the rock. The one 
who hears the words of Jesus but does not act accord-
ingly is like a foolish builder, who builds his house 
on the sand. When rain, flood, and storm come, the 
house of the wise man does not fall, but the house 
of the foolish man totally collapses (7:24–7). People 
admire Jesus as an original and impressive teacher 
(7:28–9).
To examine the dissonance-arousing elements of 
the Sermon on the Mount, the insistence on exercis-
ing superior righteousness (5:20, 48) includes pos-
sible aversive consequences: In the temptations of 
sexual lust, one is advised to tear out one’s eye, or 
tear off an arm to avoid succumbing (5:27–30). In the 
case of suffering abuse, one is advised to refrain from 
resistance (5:38–42). In 6:25–35 Jesus teaches indif-
ference towards one’s own basic needs, which is risky. 
The prohibition of hypocritical judgements (7:1–
5) may bring about dissonance-arousing situations. 
In such cases, the unwanted consequence of respon-
sible action might be to find oneself in a contradic-
tory situation with one’s social environment, if there 
is social pressure for expressing unjust judgements.12 
12 Whether this is an aversive consequence, is rather 
culture specific. For the authorial audience it probably 
was, as Cooper and Hogg (2007: 385) write: ‘The self-
Kymmenen neitsyttä (‘The Ten Virgins’, 1977), a relief by Kari Juva and Väinö Korpela in the Pyhäjoki Church. Photo: Anna 
Karjula.
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The Gospel of Matthew presents Jesus with such a sit-
uation in 9:11, where the Pharisees ask his dis ciples: 
‘Why does your teacher eat with tax collectors and sin-
ners?’ The teaching of avoiding an uncritical accept-
ance of everything (7:6) also contains risks of social 
and emotional disharmony. The warning against false 
prophets (Matt. 7:15–23) may lead to similar prob-
lems arising when one makes choices motivated by an 
intention to protect that which is sacred. 
The parable of two gates and two roads (7:13–14) 
seems to be tailored to arouse cognitive dissonance. 
The audience is given a choice between two options, 
but the broad gate and road seem to be the default. 
Hence, Jesus recommends his hearers to responsibly 
choose the narrow gate and road. The strictness of 
the gate and road of life indicates the likely unde-
sired consequences of the choice. The most immedi-
ate context for the parable is an exhortation to act 
according to the golden rule, which sums up the law 
and the prophets (7:12).
The parable of the two builders (7:24–7) contains 
elements of cognitive dissonance arousal, but the case 
is not as explicit as in the instances above. The parable 
also presents a choice between two options, but indi-
cates the preferability of the first by calling it ‘wise’, 
instead of by means of a straight exhortation. There 
are no explicit undesired consequences for building a 
house on the rock, although one may regard building 
on the rock to be more laborious.13 However, several 
risks associated with putting the teaching of Jesus into 
practice have been revealed earlier in the Sermon on 
the Mount. This parable calls upon the members of 
its audience to choose a position between ignorance 
of or obedience to the teachings of Jesus. 
As a summary, the Sermon on a Mount contains 
many dissonance-arousing elements: the authorial 
audience is being directed to risk their social rela-
tions (7:1–6, 15), material and physical welfare (6:19–
34), and even their organs and limbs (5:29–30). The 
‘golden rule’ is to be active in seeing to the needs of 
others (7:12) also implies readiness for taking any 
risks for the sake of other people.14 Hence, following 
concept of people in interdependent cultures is based 
on a joint function of the worthiness of their individ-
ual dispositions and their ability to maintain pleasant 
and harmonious relationships with others whom they 
are connected.’ 
13 This is explicit in the parallel text of Luke 6:48.
14 Matt. 19:16–21 provides further argumentation for 
this.
these ethics and ‘seeking the kingdom of God’ (6:33) 
is presented as a ‘narrow gate and road’ (7:13–14). 
The rhetorical aim of the Sermon on the Mount is 
to persuade people to enter that gate and follow that 
road. For those who care for anything other than the 
righteousness of God, this is a dissonance-arousing 
call.
Jesus in the Passion narrative
The narrative of the Gospel of Matthew is built 
around the character of Jesus. Also the prototypes 
implied by the narrative are mostly defined through 
his words and actions. He represents the ultimate 
prototype of the ‘messiah’. This brief analysis will 
not give a comprehensive picture of the prototypic al 
and dissonance-arousing features of his character. 
However, a glance at these is necessary in order to 
form an overall picture of the prototypical and dis-
sonance-arousing characters in the narrative. This is 
carried out by focusing on the most extreme element 
of his narrative; on his suffering and death. Only by 
giving the whole of his life, could he credibly set a 
prototype for others to be followed also in the harsh-
est of situations.
The suffering and death of Jesus is presented 
in chapters 26 and 27 of the Gospel of Matthew. 
However, Jesus has foretold his violent arrest and 
death to his disciples in four narratives (16:21; 17:12, 
22–3; 20:17–19). In the passion narrative formed by 
these five sections, Jesus represents the prototypes 
of the ‘blessed’ and the ‘child of God’ that he has set 
in the Sermon on the Mount. He is ‘persecuted for 
the sake of righteousness’ (5:10), and also represents 
the prototype of the prophet (see section ‘John and 
his Audience in the Baptism Narrative’ above). In 
his evening prayer before his arrest in Gethsemane 
(26:36–8) he ‘mourns’ (5:4). When arrested, he inter-
rupts the violent resistance of his disciple, being 
‘merciful’ (5:7) and a ‘peacemaker’ (5:9), ‘not resist-
ing evil’ (5:39), and ‘not worrying about his life or 
body’ (6:25). When crucified, he desperately cries out 
to God (27:46), that he is ‘poor in spirit’15 (5:4) and 
has ‘hunger and thirst for righteousness’ (5:6). 
At two points of the passion narrative, Jesus 
seems to experience dissonance due to the risk of 
suffering and death he has foreseen and chosen. The 
first of these is in 16:21–3, where he reveals to his dis-
15 On the semantics of this uncommon expression, see 
Davies and Allison (2004: 442–5).
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ciples that it is his duty to go to Jerusalem and suffer 
at the hands of the elders, high priests, and scribes. 
He will die and rise again on the third day. Having 
said this, Jesus is confronted by Peter (16:22 NRSV): 
‘God forbid it, Lord! This must never happen to you.’ 
Jesus gives him a harsh answer (16:23 NRSV): ‘Get 
behind me, Satan! You are a stumbling block to me; for 
you are setting your mind not on divine things but on 
human things.’ These fierce words indicate a feeling 
of discomfort experienced by Jesus. He knows, also 
emotionally, the risks he has chosen to take. 
In the evening of Gethsemane (26:36–45), Jesus is 
distressed and ‘deeply grieved, even to death’ (26:38 
NRSV). He handles this extreme discomfort by pray-
ing (26:39 NRSV): ‘My Father, if it is possible, let this 
cup pass from me; yet let not what I want but what you 
want be.’ During the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus 
had taught his audience a similar prayer (6:10): ‘your 
will be done, on earth as it is in heaven’. The prayer, 
which he repeats twice, has a dissonance-reducing 
content, as Cooper (2007: 76) writes: ‘Dissonance 
occurs when an individual feels personally respon-
sible for bringing about the aversive consequence … 
If responsibility can be denied, the [dissonance] pro-
cess is over.’ In this case, the paradoxical will of Jesus 
is to reject his own will and share the responsibility 
for what happens with his Father, thus making it less 
personal. 
At one point in the narrative, Jesus personally acts 
to take on the risk of a death sentence. In front of the 
council of scribes and elders, the high priest insists 
on an answer from him (26:63–4 NRSV): ‘I put you 
under oath before the living God, tell us if you are the 
Messiah, the Son of God.’ Jesus admits as much, and 
adds a prophecy: ‘You have said so. But I tell you, 
from now on you will see the Son of Man seated at 
the right hand of Power and coming on the clouds 
of heaven.’ For the high priest and the council, this 
is blasphemous enough to warrant a death sentence 
(26:65–6). Also in this situation, however, the per-
sonal responsibility of Jesus is questionable, as he is 
put ‘under oath before the living God’. This appeal 
to his relational self,16 his relationship with God, 
restricts his personal freedom in giving an answer. 
Making the concept of God salient in the moment, 
it also facilitates the denial of responsibility uttered 
in the prayer offered in Gethsemane before the trial. 
These factors reduce, if not totally prevent, the arousal 
of dissonance. Jesus has already taught his disciples a 
similar denial of responsibility: 
Beware of them, for they will hand you over to 
councils and flog you in their synagogues … 
When they hand you over, do not worry about 
how you are to speak or what you are to say; for 
what you are to say will be given to you at that 
time; for it is not you who speak, but the Spirit 
of your Father speaking through you. (Matt. 
10:17, 19–20 NRSV)17
It is also worth noting that the answer Jesus gives 
may have been less dissonance arousing than the 
alternatives of falling silent or denying his messiah-
16  On different forms of the self in cognitive dissonance 
theory, see Cooper and Hogg (2007: 364–5).
17 See also 16:24 on denial of the individual self.
Jeesus Getsemanessa (‘Jesus in Gethsemane’, 1903), a 
painting by B. Lagerstam in the Pyhäjoki Church. Photo: 
Anna Karjula.
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ship. According to the personal standards of Jesus, 
denying the will of the heavenly Father or ignoring 
an oath before his name would most probably have 
been more aversive events than violent death. 
As a summary, the actions of Jesus in the pas-
sion narrative are both dissonance arousing and dis-
sonance reducing. His last journey to Jerusalem is a 
commitment to freely chosen action with foreseea-
ble, extremely aversive consequences. His behaviour 
in the conversation with Peter and in the garden of 
Gethsemane indicate experiences of dissonance. He 
seems to reduce the dissonance by denying his per-
sonal responsibility, or at least sharing it with his 
heavenly Father. His self-sacrificing character offers 
elements for the arousal of vicarious dissonance. 
However, his conjunction with the character of the 
heavenly Father seems to facilitate responsibility 
denial and a consequential reduction of dissonance.18 
Conclusion
The Gospel of Matthew has been shown to contain 
a rich assemblage of dissonance-arousing narratives. 
Through the characters of the narrative, the audience 
is given various exhortations and examples of com-
mitments to freely chosen action with foreseeable, 
aversive consequences. At the same time, the audi-
ence is given exhortations and examples of giving 
one’s own will and identity away in favour of God’s 
will, which reduces the element of responsibility nec-
essary for dissonance arousal. This tension between 
dissonance-arousing and dissonance-reducing elem-
ents should be examined further. In any case, the 
audience is pushed to the risky choice of following 
Jesus and becoming his disciple (7:13, 16:24, 28:19). 
Only after that, may one be comforted by the heav-
enly Father. 
In order to arouse vicarious dissonance, a narra-
tive has to provide characters to be identified with. 
This identifiability between characters and the audi-
ence is based on a shared degree of prototypicality 
within social categories. In the Gospel of Matthew, 
the overall prototype implicated by the narrative 
characters can be called ‘child of God’. In the analysis, 
different varieties of this prototype were found, such 
as ‘least in the kingdom’, ‘blessed’ ‘righteous’, ‘disciple’, 
18 Vicarious affect has only been observed concerning 
voluntary choices; Cooper and Hogg (2007: 376–7).
‘prophet’, and ‘messiah’. These vary in their degree of 
prototypicality in relation to the overall prototype: 
the first mentioned are more identifiable for an aver-
age person, whereas the last are extreme prototypes. 
Attitude change is an effective way of reducing the 
discomfort of vicarious dissonance. As a result of this 
attitude change, one may identify with more extreme 
prototypes. As a result of identifying with more 
extreme prototypes, one may experience additional 
vicarious dissonance. I suggest this to be a feedback 
loop strengthening the commitment of the audience 
to the values promoted by the Gospel of Matthew 
they read and hear as a repetitive process. This sug-
gestion may have value for understanding group 
commitment in general. 
According to Cooper and Hogg (2007: 365), the 
theory of vicarious dissonance ‘may have far reach-
ing consequences for ways in which large numbers 
of people can be persuaded to change their attitudes 
and perhaps behaviors’. I hope to have given support 
to this suggestion in this article. For more than forty 
years, the theory of cognitive dissonance has been 
used to explain the origin of the Christian gospel. 
With this pioneering article, I suggest that the theory 
of vicarious dissonance is capable of leading us a 
step further, explaining the dispersal of the gospel 
through the Roman empire and elsewhere, noting 
that ‘it seems to be the case that cultures in which the 
self is interdependent provide an especially effective 
context for the arousal of vicarious cognitive disson-
ance’ (ibid. 390). 
The theory of vicarious dissonance may find fruit-
ful applications not only in biblical studies, but also 
in other areas of narrative and argumentative studies. 
The relationship between vicarious dissonance and 
the art of persuasion also demands further investi-
gation. I believe cross-disciplinary perspectives to be 
valuable in this work, and I hope this article can be 
seen to be an example of this. 
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